Pareto-improving indirect tax coordination and tax diversity

Christos Kotsogiannis and Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia

Oxford Economic Papers, 2021, vol. 73, issue 2, 561-577

Abstract: Coordination in tax matters, in the EU and elsewhere, has been largely driven by the movement of taxes towards some common level and, therefore, towards tax uniformity. Making use of a perfectly competitive general equilibrium framework of international trade in which governments provide global public goods, it is shown that, starting from a Nash equilibrium, there exist strict Pareto-improving multilateral tax reforms that are consistent with tax diversity.

JEL-codes: F15 H21 H41 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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