Nuptiality to regulate the commons? The case of the Don Cossacks (South Russia), 1867–1916

Noël Bonneuil and Elena Fursa

Oxford Economic Papers, 2021, vol. 73, issue 2, 698-717

Abstract: Sustainability in the commons has been associated with the optimal net present value controlled by the harvest rate under stationary population. Population growth however disrupts this scheme. In traditional societies, fertility was regulated by age at marriage. In times of population growth and limited resources, economic sustainability then requires that age of marriage should be raised. In the case study of the Don Cossacks, 1867–1916, early marriage, which was an important marker of social cohesion, was too slow to increase when mortality declined, fuelling a population growth that threatened the agrarian economy: age at marriage then appears to be essential to the theory of the commons in traditional societies.

JEL-codes: J11 N33 N53 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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