Ending civil wars through fraudulent elections

M. Christian Lehmann

Oxford Economic Papers, 2024, vol. 76, issue 1, 250-266

Abstract: Previous research finds a positive association between electoral fraud and post-election protests, violence, and civil conflict. This article contends that the effect of electoral fraud on peace can be heterogeneous. I investigate elections after civil wars that stalemated. My contribution is to present a theory and suggestive evidence that, in this context, electoral fraud by unpopular incumbents can be peace-promoting. An important policy implication is that international efforts to prevent electoral fraud (e.g. electoral observers), in this specific setting, may increase the odds that a civil war continues.

JEL-codes: D72 D73 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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