On the International Harmonization of Bank Regulation

Lawrence White

Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 1994, vol. 10, issue 4, 94-105

Abstract: This paper offers a three-way typology of bank regulation and examines the question of international harmonization for each category. For economic regulation, the danger is that harmonization could support and preserve domestic protectionist regulatory regimes, but it could instead be a beneficial guise for lowering protectionist barriers; the latter efforts should be encouraged. For prudential regulation, national regulation should be adequate to handle the extra stresses of international banking. Harmonization efforts (e.g. the Basle accord) may offer only modest help; but the Accord may offer indirect help, by limiting national governments' competitive efforts implicitly to subsidize their banks' risk-taking activities. Finally, for information regulation, national regulation appears to be adequate, and international harmonization does not appear to be necessary. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1994
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