Economic Voting in Brazil’s Gubernatorial Elections, 1994–2014
Lorena Barberia,
George Avelino Filho () and
Gabriel Zanlorenssi
Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2019, vol. 49, issue 2, 250-270
Abstract:
In this article, we provide new evidence that contributes to our understanding of the conditions which influence the existence and degree of economic voting in subnational elections in a multiparty context in a developing democracy. Based on data from Brazilian gubernatorial elections held between 1994 and 2014, we find confirmation, in the case of a developing democracy, of conclusions reached in other studies of developed democracies: that subnational economic voting is moderated by the structure of the state economy and federalism. We show that voters are more likely to reward incumbent governors for their management of the local economy in labor-intense jurisdictions dominated by industry and services. Economic performance in the year of the election also matters to the degree that a state has more autonomy from the federal government.
Date: 2019
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