A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

Martin Osborne and Al Slivinski

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1996, vol. 111, issue 1, 65-96

Abstract: We develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates. A winner implements her favorite policy. The equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning. For some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates, whose positions are distinct. Two-candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system (cf. Duverger's Law). The candidates' positions are less differentiated under a runoff system. There exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning.

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (719)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2946658 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates (1995)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:111:y:1996:i:1:p:65-96.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().