A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

Martin Osborne and Al Slivinksi

Department of Economics Working Papers from McMaster University

Abstract: We develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates; a winner implements her favorite policy. The equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of run ning and positively on the bene ts of winning. For some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates, whose positions are distinct. Two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system. There exists equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 1995-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcm:deptwp:1995-01

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