Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation
Michael Kremer ()
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998, vol. 113, issue 4, 1137-1167
In 1839 the French government purchased the Daguerreotype patent and placed it in the public domain. Such patent buyouts could potentially eliminate the monopoly price distortions and incentives for rent-stealing duplicative research created by patents, while increasing incentives for original research. Governments could offer to purchase patents at their estimated private value, as determined in an auction, times a markup equal to the typical ratio of inventions' social and private value. Most patents purchased would be placed in the public domain, but to induce bidders to reveal their valuations, a few would be sold to the highest bidder.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (139) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Working Paper: Patent Buy-Outs: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:113:y:1998:i:4:p:1137-1167.
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva
More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from Oxford University Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().