Creative Destruction and Firm Organization Choice
David Thesmar and
Mathias Thoenig ()
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000, vol. 115, issue 4, 1201-1237
Firms' organizational choices are influenced by external conditions such as the instability of the product market. In order to address this issue in a macroeconomic perspective, we embed the firm's choice of organizational structure in a model of growth through creative destruction, which induces endogenous market volatility. We find that an increasing supply of skill or globalization may increase the rate of creative destruction, the skill premium, and the skilled wages, and it may depress the unskilled wages. We use an original data set to test the empirical relevance of our theory.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:115:y:2000:i:4:p:1201-1237.
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