Creative Destruction and Firm Organization Choice

David Thesmar () and Mathias Thoenig
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David Thesmar: CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Firms' organizational choices are influenced by external conditions such as the instability of the product market. In order to address this issue in a macroeconomic perspective, we embed the firm's choice of organizational structure in a model of growth through creative destruction, which induces endogenous market volatility. We find that an increasing supply of skill or globalization may increase the rate of creative destruction, the skill premium, and the skilled wages, and it may depress the unskilled wages. We use an original data set to test the empirical relevance of our theory.

Keywords: Creative Destruction; Firm organization choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (58)

Published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000, Vol.115,n°4, pp.1201-1237. ⟨10.1162/003355300555051⟩

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Journal Article: Creative Destruction and Firm Organization Choice (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00485579

DOI: 10.1162/003355300555051

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