Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions

Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, vol. 116, issue 2, 519-562

Abstract: To what extent must nations cede control over their economic and social policies if global efficiency is to be achieved in an interdependent world? This question is at the center of the debate over the future role of the WTO (formerly GATT) in the realm of labor and environmental standards. In this paper we establish that the market access focus of current WTO rules is well equipped to handle the problems associated with choices over labor and environmental standards. In principle, with relatively modest changes that grant governments more sovereignty, not less, these rules can deliver globally efficient outcomes.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (164)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1162/00335530151144096 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty and International Economic Institutions (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:116:y:2001:i:2:p:519-562.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().