How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy

John List and Daniel M. Sturm

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2006, vol. 121, issue 4, 1249-1281

Abstract: This paper explores to what extent secondary policy issues are influenced by electoral incentives. We develop a two-dimensional political agency model, in which a politician decides on both a frontline policy issue and a secondary policy issue. The model predicts when the incumbent should manipulate the secondary policy to attract voters. We test our model by using panel data on environmental policy choices in the U. S. states. In contrast to the popular view that secondary policies are largely determined by lobbying, we find that there are strong effects of electoral incentives.

Date: 2006
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Working Paper: How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy (2006)
Working Paper: How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy (2004)
Working Paper: How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy (2004)
Working Paper: How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy (2004)
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