Financial Contracting Under Imperfect Enforcement
Tore Ellingsen () and
Eirik Gaard Kristiansen
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011, vol. 126, issue 1, 323-371
We develop a model of financial contracting under imperfect enforcement. Financial contracts are designed to keep entrepreneurs from diverting project returns, but enforcement is probabilistic and penalties are limited. The model rationalizes the prevalence of straight debt and common stock, and its predictions are consistent with a host of empirical capital structure regularities. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:126:y:2011:i:1:p:323-371
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