Financial Contracting Under Imperfect Enforcement
Tore Ellingsen and
Eirik Kristiansen
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011, vol. 126, issue 1, 323-371
Abstract:
We develop a model of financial contracting under imperfect enforcement. Financial contracts are designed to keep entrepreneurs from diverting project returns, but enforcement is probabilistic and penalties are limited. The model rationalizes the prevalence of straight debt and common stock, and its predictions are consistent with a host of empirical capital structure regularities. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/qje/qjq006 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:126:y:2011:i:1:p:323-371
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals
Access Statistics for this article
The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva
More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().