Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters And Pilots
Joshua Angrist (),
Susan Dynarski (),
Thomas J. Kane and
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011, vol. 126, issue 2, 699-748
We use student assignment lotteries to estimate the effect of charter school attendance on student achievement in Boston. We also evaluate a related alternative, Boston's pilot schools. Pilot schools have some of the independence of charter schools but are in the Boston Public School district and are covered by some collective bargaining provisions. Lottery estimates show large and significant score gains for charter students in middle and high school. In contrast, lottery estimates for pilot school students are mostly small and insignificant, with some significant negative effects. Charter schools with binding assignment lotteries appear to generate larger gains than other charters. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (212) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Working Paper: Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:126:y:2011:i:2:p:699-748
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva
More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from Oxford University Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().