 Concessions, Violence, and Indirect Rule: Evidence from the Congo Free State*Sara Lowes and Eduardo Montero The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2021, vol. 136, issue 4, 2047-2091 Abstract: All colonial powers granted concessions to private companies to extract natural resources during the colonial era. In Africa, these concessions were characterized by indirect rule and violence. We use the arbitrarily defined borders of rubber concessions granted in the north of the Congo Free State to examine the causal effects of this form of economic organization on development. We find that historical exposure to the concessions causes significantly worse education, wealth, and health outcomes. To examine mechanisms, we collect survey and experimental data from individuals near a former concession boundary. We find that village chiefs inside the former concessions provide fewer public goods, are less likely to be elected, and are more likely to be hereditary. However, individuals in the concessions are more trusting, more cohesive, and more supportive of sharing income. We interpret our results as reflecting how institutions and culture may act as substitutes in the context of the widespread colonial concession system. Date: 2021 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:136:y:2021:i:4:p:2047-2091. Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College |
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