Concessions, Violence, and Indirect Rule: Evidence from the Congo Free State

Sara Lowes and Eduardo Montero

No 27893, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: All colonial powers granted concessions to private companies to extract natural resources during the colonial era. Within Africa, these concessions were characterized by indirect rule and violence. We use the arbitrarily defined borders of rubber concessions granted in the north of the Congo Free State to examine the causal effects of this form of economic organization on development. We find that historical exposure to the concessions causes significantly worse education, wealth, and health outcomes. To examine mechanisms, we collect survey and experimental data from individuals near a former concession boundary. We find that village chiefs inside the former concessions provide fewer public goods, are less likely to be elected, and are more likely to be hereditary. However, individuals within the concessions are more trusting, more cohesive, and more supportive of sharing income. The results are relevant for the many places that were designated as concessions to private companies during the colonial era.

JEL-codes: D72 N47 O15 O43 Z1 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-hea and nep-his
Note: DAE DEV POL
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published as Sara Lowes & Eduardo Montero, 2021. "Concessions, Violence, and Indirect Rule: Evidence from the Congo Free State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol 136(4), pages 2047-2091.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w27893.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Concessions, Violence, and Indirect Rule: Evidence from the Congo Free State* (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27893

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w27893

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().