A Note on Incentives in Large Economies

Paul Champsaur and Guy Laroque

The Review of Economic Studies, 1982, vol. 49, issue 4, 627-635

Abstract: Nash equilibria of anonymous and efficient mechanisms are studied in economies with a continuum of traders. Conditions are given under which some or all the Nash equilibria of such mechanisms yield competitive allocations. Particular attention is payed to the case of direct mechanisms where the truth constitutes a Nash equilibrium.

Date: 1982
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2297291 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:49:y:1982:i:4:p:627-635.

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economic Studies is currently edited by Thomas Chaney, Xavier d’Haultfoeuille, Andrea Galeotti, Bård Harstad, Nir Jaimovich, Katrine Loken, Elias Papaioannou, Vincent Sterk and Noam Yuchtman

More articles in The Review of Economic Studies from Review of Economic Studies Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().