Efficient Decentralisation with a Transferable Good

M. J. Browning

The Review of Economic Studies, 1983, vol. 50, issue 2, 375-381

Abstract: There are many situations where agents supply input factors and produce a transferable good (money). This paper examines the conditions on technology under which agents can specify reward schedules which lead to an efficient outcome even if inputs are chosen non-cooperatively and preferences are private information. The characterisation of the class of technologies that allows this involves a generalization of additivity known as (n − 1)-additivity.

Date: 1983
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2297423 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:50:y:1983:i:2:p:375-381.

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economic Studies is currently edited by Thomas Chaney, Xavier d’Haultfoeuille, Andrea Galeotti, Bård Harstad, Nir Jaimovich, Katrine Loken, Elias Papaioannou, Vincent Sterk and Noam Yuchtman

More articles in The Review of Economic Studies from Review of Economic Studies Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().