Pricing and Investment Policies in a System of Competitive Commuter Railways

Yoshitsugu Kanemoto

The Review of Economic Studies, 1984, vol. 51, issue 4, 665-681

Abstract: This paper develops a simple spatial equilibrium model of a city served by competing commuter railways and analyses the effects of different transportation policies on their pricing and investment decisions. It is shown that a system of competitive railway companies does not achieve the optimal allocation. We then examine whether or not three types of government intervention, i.e. subsidies to railway companies, a rate-of-return regulation, and the ownership of residential land by railway companies, can achieve the optimal allocation.

Date: 1984
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:51:y:1984:i:4:p:665-681.

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