Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Announcement Strategy
Georges Dionne and
Review of Economic Studies, 1985, vol. 52, issue 4, 719-723
In this note, we present a strategy which relies on multi-period contracts and on a self-selection mechanism which induces the insured to announce his true risk in the first period, thus eliminating inefficiency due to adverse selection.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Working Paper: Adverse selection, repeated insurance contracts and announcement strategy (1985)
Working Paper: Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Announcement Strategy (1984)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:52:y:1985:i:4:p:719-723.
Access Statistics for this article
Review of Economic Studies is currently edited by Andrea PratEditor-Name: Bruno BiaisEditor-Name: Kjetil StoreslettenEditor-Name: Enrique Sentana
More articles in Review of Economic Studies from Oxford University Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().