Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting

Roy Radner

The Review of Economic Studies, 1986, vol. 53, issue 1, 43-57

Abstract: In a partnership game, each player's utility depends on the other players' actions through a commonly observed consequence (e.g. output, profit, price), which is itself a function of the players' actions and an exogenous stochastic environment. If a partnership game is repeated infinitely, and each player's payoff in the infinite game (supergame) is the long-run average of his expected one-period utilities, then efficient combinations of one-period actions can be sustained as Nash equilibria of the supergame even if the players cannot observe other players' actions or information, but can only observe the resulting consequences.

Date: 1986
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