Rawlsian Intergenerational Justice as a Markov-Perfect Equilibrium in a Resource Technology

Geir Asheim

The Review of Economic Studies, 1988, vol. 55, issue 3, 469-483

Abstract: The Rawlsian maximin criterion is combined with nonpaternalistic altruistic preferences in a nonrenewable resource technology. The maximin programme is shown to be time-inconsistent for a subset of initial conditions. A solution to this intergenerational conflict is found, under a given assumption, as a generically unique subgame-perfect equilibrium.

Date: 1988
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:55:y:1988:i:3:p:469-483.

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