Feasible and Continuous Implementation

Andrew Postlewaite and David Wettstein ()

The Review of Economic Studies, 1989, vol. 56, issue 4, 603-611

Abstract: There has been a great deal of research in recent years investigating the question of whether or not there exist institutions (game forms) for which the set of equilibria will coincide with the set of Walrasian equilibria. In this paper we show the existence of a game form that is feasible, both for equilibrium and disequilibrium strategies, continuous, and for which the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of (constrained) Walrasian equilibria for all pure exchange economies. The game form allows agents to behave strategically both with respect to their preferences and their initial endowments.

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:56:y:1989:i:4:p:603-611.

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