Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market

Georg Nöldeke and Eric van Damme

The Review of Economic Studies, 1990, vol. 57, issue 1, 1-23

Abstract: This paper analyzes a multiperiod version of the Spence Job Market Signalling Model in which workers cannot commit to an education choice and firms make wage offers at any point in time. The dynamic competition combined with the incomplete information yield a multiplicity of sequential equilibria, including ones that sustain implicit collusion, even though the length of the game is finite. Emphasis is placed on equilibria that satisfy the "independence of never weak best response" criterion of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). It is shown that in the limit, as the time between offers tends to zero, any such equilibrium results (in expectation) in the unique stable outcome of the static Spence model.

Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2297540 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Signaling in a dynamic labor market (1990)
Working Paper: Signalling in a dynamic labour market (1990)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:57:y:1990:i:1:p:1-23.

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economic Studies is currently edited by Thomas Chaney, Xavier d’Haultfoeuille, Andrea Galeotti, Bård Harstad, Nir Jaimovich, Katrine Loken, Elias Papaioannou, Vincent Sterk and Noam Yuchtman

More articles in The Review of Economic Studies from Review of Economic Studies Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().