Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results From Old Methods

Gérard Gaudet and Stephen Salant

The Review of Economic Studies, 1991, vol. 58, issue 2, 399-404

Abstract: This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique Cournot equilibrium. Previous uniqueness results have depended on an assumption of non-degeneracy of equilibrium. As we illustrate, this assumption often fails in multi-stage games with proper Cournot subgames. Since our uniqueness results do not depend on this assumption, they are more widely applicable.

Date: 1991
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (77)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2297975 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: UNIQUENESS OF COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM: NEW RESULTS FROM OLD METHODS (1988)
Working Paper: UNIQUENESS OF COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM: NEW RESULTS FROM OLD METHODS (1988)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:58:y:1991:i:2:p:399-404.

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economic Studies is currently edited by Thomas Chaney, Xavier d’Haultfoeuille, Andrea Galeotti, Bård Harstad, Nir Jaimovich, Katrine Loken, Elias Papaioannou, Vincent Sterk and Noam Yuchtman

More articles in The Review of Economic Studies from Review of Economic Studies Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().