The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Michihiro Kandori

The Review of Economic Studies, 1992, vol. 59, issue 3, 581-593

Abstract: The present paper formalizes the idea that improved monitoring helps coordination in long term relationships. Specifically, the pure-strategy sequential equilibrium payoff set is shown to expand (in the sense of set inclusion) in repeated games with inperfect monitoring, when the quality of the signal improves in Blackwell's sense. Furthermore, the directions of the expansion are identified.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:59:y:1992:i:3:p:581-593.

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