Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching

Glenn Ellison ()

The Review of Economic Studies, 1994, vol. 61, issue 3, 567-588

Abstract: The paper considers the repeated prisoner's dilemma in a large-population random-matching setting where players are unable to recognize their opponents. Despite the informational restrictions cooperation is still a sequential equilibrium supported by "contagious" punishments. The equilibrium does not require excessive patience, and contrary to previous thought, need not be extraordinarily fragile. It is robust to the introduction of small amounts of noise and remains nearly efficient. Extensions are discussed to models with heterogeneous rates of time preference and without public randomizations.

Date: 1994
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Working Paper: Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:61:y:1994:i:3:p:567-588.

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