A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions Which Lead to Impossibility Theorems

Matthew Jackson and Sanjay Srivastava

The Review of Economic Studies, 1996, vol. 63, issue 1, 23-38

Abstract: For some game-theoretic solution concepts, such as dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium, and undominated strategies, only dictatorial social choice functions are implementable on a full domain of preferences with at least three alternatives. For other solution concepts, such as the iterative removal of weakly dominated strategies, undominated Nash equilibrium, and maximin, it is possible to implement non-dictatorial social choice functions. Which aspects of solution concepts accounts for these differences? We answer this question by providing a characterization of solution concepts which lead to impossibility results.

Date: 1996
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Working Paper: Characterizations of Game Theoretic Solutions which Lead to Impossibility Theorems (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:63:y:1996:i:1:p:23-38.

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