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Multilateral Bargaining

Vijay Krishna and Roberto Serrano ()

Review of Economic Studies, 1996, vol. 63, issue 1, 61-80

Abstract: We study a multilateral bargaining procedure that extends Rubinstein's alternating offer game to the case of n players. The procedure captures the notion of consistency in the sense familiar in cooperative game theory and we use it to establish links to the axiomatic theory of bargaining.

Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:63:y:1996:i:1:p:61-80.

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