Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

Oliver Hart and John Moore

The Review of Economic Studies, 1999, vol. 66, issue 1, 115-138

Abstract: In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of "incomplete contracting" However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1999a). In doing so, we develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (362)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1467-937X.00080 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Foundations of incomplete contracts (1998)
Working Paper: Foundations of Incomplete Contracts (1998)
Working Paper: Foundations of Incomplete Contracts (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:66:y:1999:i:1:p:115-138.

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economic Studies is currently edited by Thomas Chaney, Xavier d’Haultfoeuille, Andrea Galeotti, Bård Harstad, Nir Jaimovich, Katrine Loken, Elias Papaioannou, Vincent Sterk and Noam Yuchtman

More articles in The Review of Economic Studies from Review of Economic Studies Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().