Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation

Philippe Jehiel () and Suzanne Scotchmer

The Review of Economic Studies, 2001, vol. 68, issue 2, 393-413

Abstract: The rules under which jurisdictions (nations, provinces) can deny immigration or expel residents are generally governed by a constitution, but there do not exist either positive or normative analyses to suggest what types of exclusion rules are best. We stylize this problem by suggesting four constitutional rules of admission: free mobility, admission by majority vote, admission by unanimous consent, admission by a demand threshold for public goods. In a simple model we characterize the equilibria that result from these rules, and provide a positive theory for which constitutional rules will be chosen.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:2:p:393-413.

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