Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems

Massimo Morelli ()

The Review of Economic Studies, 2004, vol. 71, issue 3, 829-853

Abstract: I introduce a model of representative democracy with strategic parties, strategic candidates, strategic voters and multiple districts. If policy preferences are similar across districts and not too concentrated within districts, then the number of effective parties is larger under proportional representation (PR) than under plurality, and both electoral systems determine the median voter's preferred policy. However, for more asymmetric distributions of preferences the Duvergerian predictions can be reversed, and the policy outcome with PR is more moderate than the one with plurality. Sincere voting induces more party formation, and strategic voting can be observed more often under PR. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.

Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (97)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2004.00306.x (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems (2001)
Working Paper: Party Formation and Policy Outcomes Under Different Electoral Systems (1998)
Working Paper: Party Formation and Policy Outcomes Under Different Electoral Systems (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:71:y:2004:i:3:p:829-853

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economic Studies is currently edited by Thomas Chaney, Xavier d’Haultfoeuille, Andrea Galeotti, Bård Harstad, Nir Jaimovich, Katrine Loken, Elias Papaioannou, Vincent Sterk and Noam Yuchtman

More articles in The Review of Economic Studies from Review of Economic Studies Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().