EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Judgemental Overconfidence, Self-Monitoring, and Trading Performance in an Experimental Financial Market

Bruno Biais (), Denis Hilton, Karine Mazurier and Sébastien Pouget

Review of Economic Studies, 2005, vol. 72, issue 2, 287-312

Abstract: We measure the degree of overconfidence in judgement (in the form of miscalibration, i.e. the tendency to overestimate the precision of one's information) and self-monitoring (a form of attentiveness to social cues) of 245 participants and also observe their behaviour in an experimental financial market under asymmetric information. Miscalibrated traders, underestimating the conditional uncertainty about the asset value, are expected to be especially vulnerable to the winner's curse. High self-monitors are expected to behave strategically and achieve superior results. Our empirical results show that miscalibration reduces and self-monitoring enhances trading performance. The effect of the psychological variables is strong for men but non-existent for women. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.

Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (108) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00333.x (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Judgmental Overconfidence, Self-Monitoring and Trading Performance in an Experimental Financial Market (2004) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:72:y:2005:i:2:p:287-312

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Economic Studies is currently edited by Andrea PratEditor-Name: Bruno BiaisEditor-Name: Kjetil StoreslettenEditor-Name: Enrique Sentana

More articles in Review of Economic Studies from Oxford University Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().

 
Page updated 2019-12-07
Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:72:y:2005:i:2:p:287-312