Policy Influence and Private Returns from Lobbying in the Energy Sector

Karam Kang

The Review of Economic Studies, 2016, vol. 83, issue 1, 269-305

Abstract: In this article, I quantify the extent to which lobbying expenditures by firms affect policy enactment. To achieve this end, I construct a novel dataset containing all federal energy legislation and lobbying activities by the energy sector during the 110th Congress. I then develop and estimate a game-theoretic model where heterogeneous players choose lobbying expenditures to affect the probability that a policy is enacted. I find that the effect of lobbying expenditures on a policy's equilibrium enactment probability to be statistically significant but very small. Nonetheless, the average returns from lobbying expenditures are estimated to be over 130%.

Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (79)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdv029 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:83:y:2016:i:1:p:269-305.

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economic Studies is currently edited by Thomas Chaney, Xavier d’Haultfoeuille, Andrea Galeotti, Bård Harstad, Nir Jaimovich, Katrine Loken, Elias Papaioannou, Vincent Sterk and Noam Yuchtman

More articles in The Review of Economic Studies from Review of Economic Studies Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().