Adverse Selection and Liquidity Distortion
Briana Chang
The Review of Economic Studies, 2018, vol. 85, issue 1, 275-306
Abstract:
This article develops a tractable model with two-dimensional asymmetric information in asset markets: sellers are privately informed about their asset quality and distress positions. Illiquidity arises endogenously and manifests itself through two distinct market outcomes. The first outcome features limited market participation, resulting in a dry-up in trading volume. The second outcome involves a large volume at a depressed price. Only in the latter outcome do distressed sellers engage in fire sales, quickly unwinding their positions at a steep price discount. The article further establishes that this equilibrium can arise only when buyers expect that sellers with a higher need for immediacy will on average have higher-quality assets. Hence, both the information structure and the distribution of sellers’ distress are crucial for the existence of fire sales.
Keywords: Liquidity; Fire sales; Market dry-up; Decentralized trading (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdx015 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:85:y:2018:i:1:p:275-306.
Access Statistics for this article
The Review of Economic Studies is currently edited by Thomas Chaney, Xavier d’Haultfoeuille, Andrea Galeotti, Bård Harstad, Nir Jaimovich, Katrine Loken, Elias Papaioannou, Vincent Sterk and Noam Yuchtman
More articles in The Review of Economic Studies from Review of Economic Studies Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().