Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

Takuo Sugaya

The Review of Economic Studies, 2022, vol. 89, issue 4, 2201-2256

Abstract: We show that the folk theorem holds generically for the repeated two-player game with private monitoring if the support of each player’s signal distribution is sufficiently large. Neither cheap talk communication nor public randomization is necessary.

Keywords: Repeated game; Folk theorem; Private monitoring; C72; C73; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:89:y:2022:i:4:p:2201-2256.

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