Good Politicians: Experimental Evidence on Motivations for Political Candidacy and Government Performance

Saad Gulzar and Muhammad Yasir Khan

The Review of Economic Studies, 2025, vol. 92, issue 1, 339-364

Abstract: How can we motivate good politicians—those that will carry out policy that is responsive to citizens’ preferences—to enter politics? In a field experiment in Pakistan, we vary how political office is portrayed to ordinary citizens. Emphasizing prosocial motives for holding political office instead of personal returns—such as the ability to help others versus enhancing one’s own respect and status—raises the likelihood that individuals run for office and that voters elect them. A year later, the treatment improves the alignment of policy with citizens’ preferences. These effects emerge only when treatments are randomly delivered in a public setting. Taken together, the results demonstrate that how politics is perceived shapes who decides to run for office, who is elected, as well the policies that democracies deliver.

Keywords: Political selection; Policy-making; State capacity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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