EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Signalling with Private Monitoring

Gonzalo Cisternas and Aaron Kolb

The Review of Economic Studies, 2025, vol. 92, issue 2, 909-953

Abstract: We study dynamic signalling when the sender does not see the signals that her actions generate. The sender then uses her past play to forecast what a receiver believes, in turn forcing the receiver to forecast the previous forecast, and so forth. We identify a class of linear-quadratic-Gaussian games where this endogenous higher-order uncertainty can be handled. The sender’s second-order belief is key: it is a private state that she controls, and it creates a new channel for information transmission. We examine the role of higher-order uncertainty and this new signalling channel in applications to macroeconomics, reputation, and trading: inflationary biases under discretion can be larger; career-concerned agents may benefit from not knowing their reputations; and informed trades can carry more price impact. We also introduce an existence method for boundary value problems that can be used in other dynamic games.

Keywords: Signalling; Private monitoring; Higher-order beliefs; Learning; Brownian motion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdae035 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:92:y:2025:i:2:p:909-953.

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economic Studies is currently edited by Thomas Chaney, Xavier d’Haultfoeuille, Andrea Galeotti, Bård Harstad, Nir Jaimovich, Katrine Loken, Elias Papaioannou, Vincent Sterk and Noam Yuchtman

More articles in The Review of Economic Studies from Review of Economic Studies Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-02
Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:92:y:2025:i:2:p:909-953.