Colluding Against Environmental Regulation

Jorge Alé-Chilet, Cuicui Chen, Jing Li and Mathias Reynaert

The Review of Economic Studies, 2026, vol. 93, issue 1, 35-71

Abstract: We study collusion among firms against imperfectly monitored environmental regulation. Firms increase variable profits by violating regulation and reduce expected noncompliance penalties by violating jointly. We consider a case of three German automakers colluding to reduce the effectiveness of emissions control technology. By estimating a structural model of the European automobile industry from 2007 to 2018, we find that collusion lowers expected noncompliance penalties substantially and increases buyer and producer surplus. Due to increased pollution, welfare decreases by € 1.57–5.57 billion. We show how environmental policy design and antitrust play complementary roles in preventing noncompliance.

Keywords: Collusion; Regulation; Pollution; Automobile market; Noncompliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:93:y:2026:i:1:p:35-71.

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