When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions

Orly Sade, Charles Schnitzlein and Jaime Zender

Review of Finance, 2006, vol. 10, issue 3, 389-416

Abstract: We show that asymmetry in bidders’ capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibiting collusion and promoting competitive outcomes in multi-unit auctions in which the final value of the good is common knowledge. This effect appears to be related to the increased difficulty of coordination when there are significant differences between bidders. Due to its impact on collusive outcomes, asymmetry in bidding capacities has a more powerful impact on the seller’s revenue than does the auction type. Consistent with the finding in Sade et al. (2006) that the discriminatory auction is more susceptible to collusion than the uniform-price auction, asymmetry in capacity constraints has a greater impact in discriminatory auctions. Copyright Oxford University Press 2006

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s10679-006-9003-x

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