Takeover Timing, Implementation Uncertainty, and Embedded Divestment Options

Luis Alvarez and Rune Stenbacka

Review of Finance, 2006, vol. 10, issue 3, 417-441

Abstract: We design a compound real options model, which determines the timing of takeovers and characterizes the distribution of the associated surplus. We delineate a relation between the bargaining power of the acquiring firm and the takeover incentives. The takeover threshold is decreasing as a function of the expected primary takeover gain and the embedded divestment gain. Decreased implementation uncertainty stimulates takeover activity. This uncertainty concerns the delay until either primary takeover synergies or subsequent divestment gains are realized. We demonstrate how the relation between volatility and takeover timing depends on the functional form of the profit flow with implementation uncertainty. Copyright Oxford University Press 2006

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s10679-006-9002-y

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