Secret Reservation Prices in Bookbuilding

Neil Brisley () and Walid Y. Busaba

Review of Finance, 2007, vol. 11, issue 4, 693-718

Abstract: Why is the issuer's reservation price not disclosed in bookbuilding? We analyze the differential effect of reservation price disclosure on the underpricing required to elicit truthful indications of interest from investors. We find that a policy of disclosure would increase proceeds for firms with a reservation price sufficiently high relative to possible investor valuations of the shares, but would decrease proceeds for issuers with lower reservation prices. The former group is likely to be absent from the IPO market, explaining why secrecy in reservation prices is the norm. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2007
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