Board Structures Around the World: an Experimental Investigation

Ann B. Gillette, Thomas Noe () and Michael J. Rebello

Review of Finance, 2008, vol. 12, issue 1, 93-140

Abstract: We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. We find that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred rather than self-interested policies. Two-tiered boards adopt institutionally preferred policies more frequently but tend to destroy value by being too conservative, frequently rejecting good projects. Outsider-controlled single-tiered boards, both when they have multiple insiders and only a single insider, adopt institutionally preferred policies most frequently. In those board designs where the efficient Nash equilibrium produces strictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proof equilibria, agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Board structures around the world: An experimental investigation (2008)
Working Paper: Board structures around the world: An experimental investigation (2007)
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