Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation

Ruediger Fahlenbrach

Review of Finance, 2009, vol. 13, issue 1, 81-113

Abstract: I analyze the role of executive compensation in corporate governance. As proxies for corporate governance, I use board size, board independence, CEO-chair duality, institutional ownership concentration, CEO tenure, and an index of shareholder rights. The results from a broad cross-section of large U.S. public firms are inconsistent with recent claims that entrenched managers design their own compensation contracts. The interactions of the corporate governance mechanisms with total pay-for-performance and excess compensation can be explained by governance substitution. If a firm has generally weaker governance, the compensation contract helps better align the interests of shareholders and the CEO. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2009
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