Cash Breeds Success: The Role of Financing Constraints in Patent Races

Enrique Schroth () and Dezsoe Szalay

Review of Finance, 2010, vol. 14, issue 1, 73-118

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of financing constraints in patent races. We develop a model of optimal contracting where firms finance their R&D expenditures with an investor who cannot verify their effort. In equilibrium, firms are more likely to win the more cash and assets they hold prior to the race, and the less cash and assets their rivals hold prior to the race. Evidence from US pharmaceutical patents awarded between 1975 and 1999 supports our theoretical predictions. Copyright 2010, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2010
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Related works:
Working Paper: Cash Breeds Success: The Role of Financing Constraints in Patent Races (2008)
Working Paper: Cash Breeds Success: The Role of Financing Constraints in Patent Races (2008)
Working Paper: Cash breeds Success: The Role of Financing Constraints in Patent Races (2005)
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