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Warrants on the London Stock Exchange: Pricing Biases and Investor Confusion

Gordon Gemmill and Dylan Thomas

Review of Finance, 1997, vol. 1, issue 1, 31-49

Abstract: This study of warrants on the London Stock Exchange examines whether they display particular pricing biases and whether investors understand how to value them at the time of issue. In a sample of 72 warrants on closed-end funds (investment trusts) over the 1985–94 period, more than one third of the 12,673 prices are anomalously low. The other two thirds behave like stock options, with lower volatility when they are in-the-money or have a long time until maturity. Despite their frequent undervaluation, it is rational to add warrants to a new equity issue. An examination of 127 new equity issues (95 with warrants) reveals that attaching warrants significantly increases market value. The reason for this appears to be investor confusion: they do not seem to understand that the more the warrants are worth, the less the value of the ordinary shares.

Date: 1997
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