Non-Exclusive Financial Advice

Salvatore Piccolo (), Giovanni Puopolo and Luis Vasconcelos ()

Review of Finance, 2016, vol. 20, issue 6, 2079-2123

Abstract: We propose a simple model of non-exclusive financial advice in which two households rely on a self-interested (common) expert to make their investment choices. There is only one source of risk, and the expert is privately informed about the risky asset’s volatility. When monetary transfers are unenforceable, we show that investors may delegate their investment decisions to the expert. When doing so, however, they impose restrictions on her choices which crucially depend on whether the expert perceives investors’ asset allocations as complements or as substitutes. Finally, we analyze the implications of non-exclusivity in financial advice on investment behavior and welfare, and highlight a set of novel testable implications.

JEL-codes: G11 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Non-Exclusive Financial Advice (2015)
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