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Regime-Dependent Sovereign Risk Pricing During the Euro Crisis

Anne-Laure Delatte (), Julien Fouquau and Richard Portes ()

Review of Finance, 2017, vol. 21, issue 1, 363-385

Abstract: Previous work has documented a greater sensitivity of long-term government bond yields to fundamentals in euro area peripheral countries during the euro crisis, but we know little about the driver(s) of regime switches. Our estimates based on a panel smooth threshold regression model quantify and explain them: (1) investors have penalized a deterioration of fundamentals more strongly from 2010 to 2012; (2) the higher the bank credit risk, measured with the premium on credit derivatives, the higher the extra premium on fundamentals; (3) after ECB President Draghi’s speech in July 2012, it took 1 year to restore the noncrisis regime and suppress the extra premium.

JEL-codes: E44 F34 G12 H63 C23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Regime-Dependent Sovereign Risk Pricing During the Euro Crisis (2017)
Working Paper: Regime-dependent sovereign risk pricing during the euro crisis (2016) Downloads
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