Bank Regulation, CEO Compensation, and Boards
Julian Kolm,
Christian Laux and
Gyöngyi Lóránth
Review of Finance, 2017, vol. 21, issue 5, 1901-1932
Abstract:
We analyze the limits of regulating bank CEO compensation to reduce risk shifting in the presence of an active board that retains the right to approve new investment strategies. Compensation regulation prevents overinvestment in strategies that increase risk, but it is ineffective in preventing underinvestment in strategies that reduce risk. The regulator optimally combines compensation and capital regulations. In contrast, if the board delegates the choice of strategy to the CEO, compensation regulation is sufficient to prevent both types of risk shifting. Compensation regulation increases shareholders’ incentives to implement an active board, which reduces the effectiveness of compensation regulation.
Keywords: Bank regulation; Executive compensation; Corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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