Product Market Competition and the Severity of Distressed Asset Sales
Vinicius Carrasco and
João Manoel Pinho De Mello
Review of Finance, 2017, vol. 21, issue 5, 2007-2043
This article explores the effect of an industry’s market structure on the liquidation value of assets. We show that when firms with financial constraints compete for the gains arising from market concentration, they expend insufficient efforts to deploy assets across industries, leading to significant liquidation discounts when compared with an efficient benchmark. Equilibrium distress costs and private costs of leverage should increase with the rents linked to concentration in the product market.
JEL-codes: G3 D21 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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